Developing a School Funding Remedy Framework for Ohio and Beyond by Joslin, James C.
Developing a School Funding Remedy
Framework for Ohio and Beyond
JAMES C. JOSLIN
I. INTRODUCTION
Some of our students are being educated in former coal bins in Mt. Gilead. In
Flushing the students have no restroom in the school building itself. In Brown
County the only library is an abandoned library truck; the band practices in the
kitchen and plays in the cafeteria during lunch. In Nelsonville the building is
slipping down a hill. At Plaintiff Northern Local children are educated in
modular units situated outside the school with no running water. At Plaintiff
Southern Local students recently completed their entire school careers in
buildings that for the most part were determined to be improper housing in
1981. Prior to obtaining their new facility Southern Local Board Member
Louis Altier was of the opinion that his animals were housed better than his
district's school children-at least they were dry and warm.1
Such is the current state of public education for many of the children in
Ohio. The problem is not limited to Ohio, however, but is national in scope
and alarming in magnitude. A recent report issued by the General Accounting
Office estimates that one-third of the nation's eighty thousand public schools
are in such poor repair that the students attending them are being educated in
unsafe or unsuitable conditions. 2
For over twenty years a battle has been waged in the courts to help redress
the above-mentioned inequities in public education. Most of the attacks have
centered on spending per-pupil disparities, which result from funding
I DeRolph v. State, No. 22043, mem. op. 463, 474 (Ohio C.P., Perry County, July 1,
1994).
2 See William H. Honan, 14 Million Pupils in Unsuitable or Unsafe Schools, Report
Says, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 1995 at A21. As educator and author Iohnathan Kozol stated
after touring poor school districts nationwide:
One searches for some way to understand why a society as rich and, frequently, as
generous as ours would leave these children in their penury and squalor for so long-
and with so little public indignation. Is it Unusual? Is it an American Anomaly? Even if
the destitution and the racial segregation and the toxic dangers of the air and soil cannot
be immediately addressed, why is it that we can't at least pour vast amounts of money,
ingenuity and talent into public education for these children?
JOHNATHAN KOZOL, SAVAGE INEQUALITIES 40 (1991).
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mechanisms that rely largely on local property taxes. 3 In 1973 the United
States Supreme Court effectively closed the federal courts to challenges against
disparities in state funding systems by refusing in San Antonio Independent
School District v. Rodriguez4 to recognize a fundamental right to education
under the United States Constitution.5 This decision did not sound the death-
knell for school funding litigation, however, as litigants quickly seized the
opportunity to bring their claims in state court under state constitutional law.
School funding plaintiffs found-and continue to find-state courts
attractive for two main reasons. First, state courts in their interpretation of their
state equal protection clauses can go beyond holdings of the United States
Supreme Court and recognize a broader class of constitutionally-protected
rights.6 Second, unlike the federal constitution, all of the state constitutions
contain an education clause of some kind.7 While these clauses differ in
wording from state to state, they allow state courts to use explicit, textually-
3 See Mark Jaffe & Kenneth Kersch, Guaranteeing a State Right to a Quality
Education: The Judicial-Political Dialogue in New Jersey, 20 J.L. & EDUC., 271, 279
(1991). Districts that have higher property values can tax at a lower rate and still raise much
more revenue for the schools than districts with low property values. When one also
considers that residents in low property value districts are already being highly taxed to
provide for basic municipal functions, such as police and fire protection, it becomes evident
why so many poor districts cannot raise sufficient funds for education. See id.4 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
5 Id. at 29-40. The Court then applied the rational basis test and found that the
property tax-based system was rationally related to the legitimate state interest of giving
substantial control over the education system to the local school districts. Id. at 55.
One author claims that even with Rodriguez, a federal judicial remedy is still possible
under "suspect classification" analysis, the other possible avenue besides "fundamental
rights" analysis for courts to invoke "strict scrutiny." Because the majority of the education
problems are in the inner city, the argument is that the inner city poor create a definable
"suspect classification." See Amy Schmitz, Note, Providing an Escape for Inner aty
Chidren, 78 MINN. L. RaV. 1639, 1662 (1994).
6 See Bill Swinford, Shredding the Doctrinal Security Blanket: How State Supreme
Courts Interpret Their State Constitutions in the Shadow of Rodriguez, 67 TEMP. L. REv.
981, 981 (1994). The ability and willingness of state courts to go beyond the holdings of the
United States Supreme Court in equal protection jurisprudence exists even though most state
supreme courts have adopted the equal protection methodology used by the United States
Supreme Court. Id.
7 Jonathan Banks, Note, State Constitutional Analysis of Public School Finance Reform
Cases: Myth or Methodology, 45 VAND. L. REV. 129, 140 (1992). There is some debate on
whether the education clauses in Alabama and Mississippi contain a specific duty to educate.
Id. at 140 n.65.
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grounded support to eliminate gross funding disparities in public education. 8
Plaintiffs have indeed utilized both state equal protection and education clauses
in their attack on property tax-based funding systems. The results of these cases
have been mixed, as some courts have upheld their funding systems against
constitutional challenges, 9 while others have held that their state funding
systems violate the education clause,10 the equal protection clause,11 or both. 12
Out of this substantial and amorphous body of case law, three important
trends have emerged. First, state courts in recent years have been more willing
to find property tax-based funding systems unconstitutional under their state
constitutions.1 3 Second, litigants and courts are utilizing education clauses
8 See Molly McUsic, The Use of Education Causes in Sdhol Finance Reform
Litigation, 28 HARv. I. ONLEFGS. 307, 311 (1991). Relying solely on the education clause
allows courts to avoid the difficult questions and possible ramifications associated with
"fundamental rights" and "suspect classification" analysis. See id. at 313. Education clauses
are also appealing to litigants and courts because strict equality principles are not necessarily
involved, as they are with equal protection clauses. Id. at 312.
9 See, e.g., Lujan v. Colorado State Bd. of Educ., 649 P.2d 1005 (Colo. 1982);
McDaniel v. Thomas, 285 S.E.2d 156 (Ga. 1981); Thompson v. Engelking, 537 P.2d 635
(Idaho 1975); Hornbeck v. Somerset County Bd. of Educ., 458 A.2d 758 (Md. 1983);
Skeen v. State, 505 N.W.2d 299 (Minn. 1993); Board of Educ., Levittown Free Sch.
District v. Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d 359 (N.Y. 1982), appeal dismissed for want of substantial
federal question, 459 U.S. 1138 (1983); Board of Educ. of City Sch. Dist. of Cincinnati v.
Walter, 390 N.E.2d 813 (Ohio 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1015 (1980); Fair Sch. Fin.
Council of Okla., Inc. v. State, 746 P.2d 1135 (Okla. 1987); Olsen v. State, 554 P.2d 139
(Or. 1976); Danson v. Casey, 399 A.2d 360 (Pa. 1979); Richland County v. Campbell, 364
S.E.2d 470 (S.C. 1988); Scott v. Commonwealth, 443 S.E.2d 138 (Va. 1994); Kukor v.
Grover, 436 N.W.2d 568 (Wis. 1989).
10 See, e.g., Roosevelt Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 66 v. Bishop, 877 P.2d 806 (Ariz.
1994); Rose v. Council for Better Educ., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989); Helena Elementary
Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 769 P.2d 684 (Mont. 1989), amended by 784 P.2d 412 (1990);
Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359 (N.J. 1990); Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 585 P.2d 71
(Wash. 1978); Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859 (W. Va. 1979).
II See, e.g., DuPree v. Alma Sch. Dist. No. 30, 651 S.W.2d 90 (Ark. 1983); Serrano
v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929 (Cal. 1976), cert. denied sub nom. Clowes v. Serrano, 432 U.S.
907 (1977); Horton v. Meskill, 376 A.2d 359 (Conn. 1977); Washakie County Sch. Dist.
No. 1 v. Hersehler, 606 P.2d 310 (Wyo.), cert. denied sub nom. Hot Springs County Sch.
Dist. No. 1 v. Washakie County Sch. Dist. No. 1, 449 U.S. 824 (1980).
12 See, e.g., Opinion of Justices, 624 So. 2d 107 (Ala. 1993) (upon state senate
request, the Alabama Supreme Court advised that the legislature was required to comply
with circuit court order to provide students with equitable educational opportunities);
Tennessee Small Sch. Sys. v. McWherter, 851 S.W.2d 139 (Tenn. 1993); Edgewood
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391 ('ex. 1989).
13 See Gail R. Levine, Meeting the Third Wave: Legislative Approaches to Recent
Judicial School Finance Rulings, 28 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 507, 508 (1991) (stating that the
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more, either by themselves or in conjunction with state equal protection
clauses. 14 Finally, and most importantly for purposes of this Note, a noticeable
gap between "right and remedy" has emerged in the majority of the states
striking down education funding systems.15
This Note provides a suggested framework for the Ohio Supreme Court16
and other state supreme courts when and if they grapple with the remedy stage
of school funding litigation. While other articles have thoroughly covered the
question of whether funding disparities of large magnitudes are unconstitutional
in Ohio and in other states, 17 there remains an important unresolved question:
what should be the next step after a state court has declared a school funding
system unconstitutional. Whether and to what extent the courts should involve
themselves in the remedy stages of school funding litigation are questions that
must be carefully considered and resolved in order to help secure a
constitutionally acceptable level of education. While this Note focuses on the
school funding litigation in Ohio and proceeds under the assumption that the
Ohio Supreme Court will find the current system of funding unconstitutional,
the remedy framework developed herein is intended to be one of general
applicability. Because the states are all facing similar issues in the remedy
stage, these issues can be addressed largely by developing a single
framework.18
Part II of this Note briefly discusses the history and current state of school
funding in Ohio in order to set the framework for the remedy analysis in the
rest of the Note. Part III argues that while courts were originally correct in
granting total deference to the legislature during the remedy stage, history and
"third wave" of school funding litigation, started in 1989, has produced extremely favorable
results for plaintiffs).
14 See McUsic, supra note 8, at 311; supra notes 10, 12 and accompanying text (citing
cases that have relied upon the education clause alone or the education clause in conjunction
with the equal protection clause).
15 See Schmitz, supra note 5, at 1654; Note, Unfidfilled Promises: School Financing
Remedies and State Courts, 104 HARv. L. REv. 1072, 1085 (1991).
16 See infra part II for the discussion on school finance litigation in Ohio.
17 See, e.g., Morris L. Hawk, "As Perfect As Can Be Devised": DeRolph v. State of
Ohio and the Right To Education in Ohio, 45 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 679 (1995); Susan P.
Leviton & Matthew H. Joseph, An Adequate Education For All Maryland's hialdren:
Morally Paght, Economically Necessary, and Constitutionally Required, 52 MD. L. REv.
1137 (1993); Karen V. Martin, Comment, Constitutional Law-Tennessee Small School
Systems v. McWherter: Opening the Door for Education Refor, 24 MEM. ST. U. L. REV.
393 (1994); Troy Reynolds, Note, Education Finance Reform Litigation and Separation of
Powers: Kentucky Makes Its Contribution, 80 KY. L.. 309 (1992).
18 This is not to say that all of the issues are identical or that what works for one state
will necessarily work for another.
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logic show that this level of deference is no longer warranted. Finally, Part IV
proposes a framework for state supreme courts to follow in the remedy stage to
determine an acceptable and necessary level of judicial involvement. This
framework includes: (1) analyzing the nature of the relationship between the
legislature and the courts to help determine the level of judicial involvement;
(2) providing a workable definition of the education clause to the legislature;
(3) helping to ensure that a system which is in conformity with the state
constitution is indeed established; (4) retaining jurisdiction during the remedy
stage; and (5) exercising judicial restraint once a court approved plan is in
place.
I. SCHOOL FUNDING IN OHIO
In the 1976 school funding case, Board of Education v. Walter, the Ohio
Supreme Court upheld the property tax-based system of financing education. 19
While the court did not explicitly hold that a fundamental right to education is
lacking under the Ohio Constitution, the court applied the rational basis test
because the case dealt with "difficult questions of local and statewide taxation,
fiscal planning and education policy ... ."20 In rejecting the equal protection
claim, the court found that the current system of funding was rationally related
to the legitimate state interest of allowing and fostering control in the local
school districts. 21 While the court acknowledged that the state education clause
required a "thorough and efficient" education, 22 the court found that an
adequate education was available for all students in Ohio; and because the
education clause gives the power of the purse to the legislature, the court
granted great deference to the legislature in determining the meaning and reach
of an adequate education.23
19 340 N.E.2d 813 (Ohio 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1015 (1980).
20 Id. at 819.
21 Id. at 819-20. The court stated: "[w]e conclude that local control provides a rational
basis supporting the disparity in per pupil expenditures in Ohio's school districts. This
conclusion is valid from an historical point of view, and is also supported by conventional
wisdom concerning educational policy." Id. at 821. In reaching this determination, the court
relied primarily on the United States Supreme Court's holding in Rodriguez. Id.
22 Id. at 380. The Ohio Constitution states that "[t]he general assembly shall make such
provisions, by taxation, or otherwise, as, with the income arising from the school trust fund,
will secure a thorough and efficient system of common schools throughout the State ...."
OHio CONST. art. VI, § 2.
23 Id. at 388-89. It is interesting to note that the court found only that an "adequate
education" was available to all of Ohio's youth, not a "thorough and efficient" one. As one
author aptly notes, Wafter is a "curious opinion" in that "the court decided the case without
ever deciding [the important] issues. It failed to determine whether education was a
12511995]
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Since the Walter decision, the state has continued to rely largely on local
property taxes to fund public education. By so doing, the state has perpetuated
an unconscionable disparity. The wealthiest districts receive roughly eleven
thousand dollars per year per student, and the poorest districts receive around
three thousand dollars per year per student.24 Only two other states have
funding systems for education more inequitable than Ohio's.25
The Ohio Coalition for Equity and Adequacy in School Funding2 6 recently
challenged this disparity in DeRolph v. State.27 In a thorough opinion,28 the
Perry County Common Pleas Court found education to be a fundamental right
and held that the current system of education finance in Ohio was
unconstitutional under the state equal protection and education clauses. 29 The
court distinguished Walter on the grounds that Walter dealt with the state
school funding system in the 1970's, while DeRolph focused on the system in
the 1990's. 30 In particular, the court stated:
Everyday education becomes more and more important and the connection
between education and the rights guaranteed by Art. I § 1 becomes greater and
greater. Today we live in a high tech world. A world that is becoming more
technologically advanced at a rapid pace. The measure of education has never
been viewed as a static measure.... In light of our founding fathers'
constitutional guarantees and the extreme importance of education in today's
society this Court finds education to be a fundamental right guaranteed by the
Ohio Constitution. 3
1
In holding that the State had not provided a "thorough and efficient" system of
education, the court cited to the gross inequity of education funding among the
districts, the large percentage of high school seniors who had not yet mastered
freshman-level skills, and the deplorable physical environment that existed in
fundamental right and... [it] decided the [thorough and efficient] issue on its own facts,
not the trial court findings." Hawk, supra note 17, at 686.
24 Mary Beth Lane, State Board Refuses to Back Voinovich on School Funding Fight,
CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, July 13, 1994, at 1A.
25 DeRolph v. State, No. 22043, mem. op. 463, 468 (Ohio C.P., Perry County,
July 1, 1994).
26 The coalition represents 500 of the 612 school districts in Ohio. Hawk, supra note
17, at 680-81.
27 DeRolph v. State, No. 22043, mem. op. 463, 474 (Ohio C.P., Perry County,
July 1, 1994).
28 The opinion (including the findings of fact) is over 500 pages long.
29 DeRolph v. State, No. 22043, mem. op. 463, 475 (Ohio C.P., Perry County, July 1
1994).30 Id. at 466.
31 Id. at 468-69.
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the plaintiff school districts. 32 While this was a momentous victory for
proponents of school funding reform, the celebration was short lived.
The Ohio Court of Appeals, in an opinion severely lacking in substance,
reversed the decision of the common pleas court.33 With absolutely no
analysis, the court dismissed the common pleas court's determination that the
increased emphasis on education today elevated education to the status of a
"fundamental right." 34 In holding that local control provided a rational basis
for the disparity produced by the state funding system, the court did not
address the common pleas court's conclusion that local control without
sufficient funds amounted to no control at all. 35 What is worse, the court mixed
in notions of the political question doctrine with its entire discussion here, by
stating, "[t]his issue should not be legislated by the judiciary but should be
brought before the General Assembly for public debate and change if necessary
or desired." 36 This statement is simply preposterous, given that the Ohio
Supreme Court in Walter held that the judiciary had a duty to rule on the
constitutionality of school funding legislation passed by the Ohio Legislature. 37
Finally in reversing the common pleas court's conclusion that the funding
system violated the education clause, the court merely stated that "no expert
testimony was offered to establish that [the plaintiff school districts] lacked the
means to come into compliance [with the state laws] for those areas in which
school administrators believe that a lack of compliance currently exists." 38 The
court did not address the common pleas court's substantial findings of fact on
the "thorough and efficient" issue, and absolutely no analysis was undertaken
by the court to determine if the state standards themselves created a system of
education that was not "thorough and efficient." Simply put, the court of
appeals opinion has a conclusion but no analysis. As the plaintiffs have
appealed this decision, the Ohio Supreme Court will have the final word on the
constitutionality of the school funding system in Ohio. 3 9
32 Id. at 473-75.
33 DeRolph v. State, No. CA-477, 1995 Ohio App. LEXIS 3915 (Aug. 30, 1995).
34 Id. at *9-12.
35 See id.
36 Id. at *10-11.
37 See Board of Educ. v. Walter, 390 N.E.2d 813, 823 (Ohio 1979).
38 DeRolph v. State, No. CA-477, 1995 Ohio App. LEXIS 3915, *13 (Aug. 30,
1995).
39 See Thomas Suddes, Schools Drift Into Eighth Inning, CLEVELAND PLAiN DEALER,
Sept. 7, 1995 at lB.
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IMl. REDUCING THE LEVEL OF JUDICIAL DEFERENCE IN
THE REMEDY STAGE
A. The Reasons for Judicial Deference Are Largely Historically Based
To understand why there has been little judicial involvement during the
remedy stages of school funding litigation, the reasons for the initial reluctance
by the judiciary to offer relief of any kind to plaintiffs should be considered.
Courts were reluctant to take an aggressive role in school funding litigation for
two main reasons. 4 First, courts believed that there was no certainty on how to
provide the greatest educational opportunity for all of the state's children. 41
Courts that relied on this ground for non-involvement believed that they lacked
the "judicial competence" to effectively understand and manage an issue so
involved and complex as school funding.42 Second, courts did not want to
excessively involve themselves with issues of taxation. 43 Because most state
constitutions give the taxing powers to the legislature, courts feared that
excessive involvement with school funding would disrupt the legislatures'
"power of the purse."44
These concerns expressed by the courts were and are theoretically
legitimate; however, the harsh reality was that the state legislatures were not
adequately addressing the significant inequalities present in their respective
education systems. Starting with favorable rulings by the highest courts in
California 45 and New Jersey,46 state courts began to address the ineptitude of
the legislatures by striking down inequitable funding systems.47 Yet these were
uncharted waters for judicial involvement. To successfully navigate in this
unknown area of judicial review, the courts tried to craft their holdings to
emphasize the fact that the solutions to the problems of school funding still
rested primarily with the legislature.48
4 0 See Unified Sch. Dist. No. 229 v. State, 885 P.2d 1170, 1188-89 (Kan. 1994)
(citing to the many courts that have relied on these reasons in justifying their deference).
41 Id.
42 John Dayton, An Anatomy of School Funding Litigation, 77 WEsT. ED. LAW REP.
627, 645 (1992).
43 See Unified School Dist. No. 299, 885 P.2d at 1189.
44 See Note, Unfidfilled Promises, supra note 15, at 1083.
45 Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929 (Cal. 1976), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 907 (1977).
46 Robinson v. Cahill (Robinson 1), 303 A.2d 273 (N.J.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976
(1973).
47 See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text.
48 See George D. Brown, Bindling Advisory Opinions: A Federal Courts Perspective on
the State School Finance Decisions, 35 B.C. L. REV. 543, 544 (1994).
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This deference continues today49 and consists of essentially three
characteristics. First, the courts have given little guidance to the legislatures on
what is a constitutionally acceptable level of education. 50 This is not to say that
the courts have neglected the constitutional analysis. What the courts have
neglected, is the translation of the legal analysis into a practical and workable
definition for the legislature.51
Second, the advice or guidance given by the courts has largely focused on
increasing the funding levels, that is, increasing the education "inputs," 52 to the
districts not receiving the constitutionally required level of education. Courts
have been reluctant to define the constitutional requirements of education
reform in terms of performance improvements, that is, education "outputs." 53
Finally, state supreme courts have been extremely reluctant to take various
measures, such as allowing the trial court to retain jurisdiction during the
remedy stage,54 that would send a clear message to the legislature indicating
the court's willingness and ability to correct the problems with the education
system.
While the judiciary's perceived lack of competence in the areas of
education reform and taxation55 help explain the reasons for this continued
deference, other factors are influential. First, the majoritarian constraints that a
democratic society places on many state courts may lead the courts to shy away
from unpopular decisions. 56 Most state judges are elected and subjected to
periodic review by the electorate. 57 Furthermore, because most state
constitutions, unlike the federal constitution, are easily amended, a broad ruling
49 See Brown, supra note 48, at 544. A few state supreme courts, however, have
recently taken a more involved role. Charles S. Benson, Definitions of Equity in School
Finance in Texos, New Jersey, and Kentucky, 28 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 401, 407-20 (1991)
(stating that Texas, New Jersey, and Kentucky have taken a more active and expansive role
in defining their various constitutional requirements for education). Out of these three states,
however, the courts in Texas and New Jersey have both had difficulties in securing the
constitutionally required level of education. The problems with the remedies in Texas and
New Jersey, and the strong points of the Kentucky decision are discussed infra part V.C.
50 This shortfall has decreased somewhat recently. Both the Kentucky and New Jersey
Supreme Courts have clearly and concisely defined their respective constitutional
requirements. See Rose v. Council for Better Educ., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989); Abbott v.
Burke (Abbott 11), 575 A.2d 359 (N.J. 1990).
51 See infra part IV.B for the proposed framework for Ohio.
52 See Levine, supra note 13, at 516; Benson, supra note 49, at 417-20.
53 See Levine, supra note 13, at 518-19.
54 See Note, Unfidfilled Promises, supra note 15, at 1085-86.
55 See supra notes 40-44 and accompanying text.
56 See Note, Unfidfilled Promises, supra note 15, at 1083.
57 Id. at 1084.
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by a state court could possibly raise a question about the legitimacy of the
court.5 8 Finally, Professor George Brown contends that the state courts, to
some extent, are consciously developing their own approach to this complex
issue.59 He argues that, by being less managerial and more advisory, the courts
are attempting to conquer the school funding crisis by forging a bond and
fostering a working relationship with the legislature.60 While all of the above
factors help explain the reasons for the judicial deference, they do not
justify the continuation of this level of deference, especially in light of the
problems encountered by litigants in securing an adequate education.
B. The School Funding Saga in New Jersey Illustrates the Need for
Increased Judicial Involvement
One need only look to the saga of school funding litigation in New Jersey
to see how the "gap between right and remedy" in school funding litigation
emerged.61 The New Jersey Supreme Court first declared the school funding
system unconstitutional in 1973 in Robinson v. Cahill.62 Since the original
ruling, the New Jersey Supreme Court has handed down nine more rulings or
orders on the subject. 63 After five rulings granting plenty of time and deference
to the legislature, the court finally issued an injunction that forbade the state
from operating an unconstitutional school system.64 While the legislature then
developed a new funding plan and the court lifted the injunction, 65 the school
funding crisis was far from over.
58 Id.
59 See Brown, supra note 48, at 563-67.
60 Id. at 566.
61 See Note, Unfidfilled Promises, supra note 15, at 1078. While New Jersey is being
used as the main example in this section, the problems that the New Jersey Supreme Court
has had to confront are hardly unique to New Jersey. To date, courts in California, Texas,
West Virginia, New Jersey, and Washington have had to confront "second round"
compliance litigation after their respective state supreme courts had declared the education
system unconstitutional. See also G. Alan I-Ickrod et al., The Effect of Constitutional
Litigation on Education Finance: A Preliminary Analysis, 18 J. OF EDUC. FIN. 180, 208-09
(1992).
62 Robinson v. Cahill (Robinson I), 303 A.2d 273 (N.J.) cert. denied sub nom. Dickey
v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 976 (1973).
63 See Mark Jaffe & Kenneth Kersch, supra note 3, at 282.
64 Robinson v. Cahill (Robinson VI), 358 A.2d 457 (N.J.), injunction resolved by 360
A.2d 400 (1976).
65 Robinson v. Cahill (Robinson VII), 360 A.2d 400 (N.J. 1976).
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The new funding plan was then challenged in Abbott v. Burke66 for its
failure to achieve a "thorough and efficient" 67 education for the urban poor.
Even though the supreme court found the plan unconstitutional as applied to the
urban poor,6s the court refused once again to impose its own remedy. 69 The
legislature again revised the plan and it was once again challenged in court. In
1994 the court ruled that the plan was still unconstitutional as applied to the
urban poor.70 While the court retained jurisdiction and stated that it would
enter orders in appropriate circumstances, it gave the legislature until
September 1996 to ensure that a plan is implemented that will ensure
"substantial equivalence" among all the students and that the needs of those in
special education programs are sufficiently integrated into the plan.7 1 In
deciding against taking a more active role, the court noted that the legislature
had made substantial progress toward meeting the constitutional mandate set by
the court.72 While the court had good motives in granting deference to the
legislature here,73 many commentators believe that "the court's impassioned
quest for equal educational opportunities remains an illusory one." 74
Given the saga of litigation in New Jersey and other states, coupled with
the somewhat disappointing results in securing an effective remedy, 75 one
might plausibly conclude that the school funding experiment by the courts was
a failure and that they should no longer be involved with the issue. With the
great inequities present in the current system, however, removing the courts
from this legitimate exercise of judicial review would only exacerbate the
66 Abbott v. Burke (Abbott RI), 575 A.2d 359 (N.J. 1990).
67 New Jersey's education clause is extremely similar to Ohio's. See supra note 22 for
text of Ohio's "thorough and efficient" clause.68 Abbott 11, 575 A.2d at 363.
69 Id. at 411.
70 Abbott v. Burke (Abbott 111), 643 A.2d 575, 576 (N.J. 1994).7 1 Id. at 576-77.
72 Id.
73 See infra part IV and accompanying text for an analysis of when courts should give
more deference to the legislatures.
74 See, e.g., Edward B. Foley, Education for Deliberative Democracy: Defining a
Constitutional Standard of Educational Opportunity, (Aug. 1995) (unpublished manuscript
on file with Ohio State Law Journal). For the problems with the Abbott approach and ways
to improve upon it, see infra part IV.B.
75 There is overall agreement that substantial deference in other states during the
remedy process has also created problems in securing a constitutionally acceptable
education. See Note, Unfidfilled Promises, supra note 15, at 1078-81 (arguing that the
legislatures have been unable to construct sufficient remedies largely because the wealthy
school districts have disproportionate control over the legislative process); Schmitz, supra
note 5, at 1661-72 (arguing for federal judicial intervention to more adequately ensure a
remedy for the urban poor).
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problem.76 Yet at the same time, continuing under the assumption that the
courts can sufficiently address the problems by merely declaring the current
education system unconstitutional is no longer warranted. 77 The courts need to
consider the level and type of involvement they will take. The following section
of this Note addresses both of these issues.
IV. DETERMINING How MUCH AND WHAT KIND OF JUDICIAL
INVOLVEMENT IS NECESSARY TO SECURE AN EFFECTIVE REMEDY
A. The Level of Involvement Should Depend to Some Extent on the
Legislature's Willingness to Act
A few courts have correctly concluded that the willingness of the
legislature to take the initiative to eliminate gross disparities caused by
traditional funding mechanisms should be a key factor in determining the level
of judicial involvement. For example, the Arizona Supreme Court, which
recently found the Arizona property tax-based system unconstitutional, granted
substantial deference to the legislature to enact a system of funding that satisfies
the Arizona constitutional requirement of a "general and uniform" education. 78
The court justified this deference by stating that, "there is significant public
support for reform and that the Governor, the Superintendent of Public
76 While school funding cases do involve issues of taxation and legislative planning,
the court's job is not to enact a new plan, but to decide whether the contested plan passes
constitutional muster. This is by no means "judicial legislation." As the Kentucky Supreme
Court stated:
The issue before us-the constitutionality of the system of statutes that created the
common schools-is the only issue. To avoid deciding the case because of "legislative
discretion," "legislative function," etc., would be a denigration of our own
constitutional duty. To allow the General Assembly... to decide whether its actions
are constitutional is literally unthinkable.
Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 209 (1989).
77 As one author stated, "[o]ne of the ironies in this judicial deference is that 'efforts
by courts to avoid direct involvement in formulating change may have the effect of
extending the duration of their involvement and thereby arousing the very charges of
meddling that they were attempting to prevent.'" Dayton, supra note 42, at 646 (quoting La
Morte, Court Decisions and School Finance Reform, 21 EDUC. ADmIN. Q. 59, at 72
(1985)).
78 Roosevelt Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 66 v. Bishop, 877 P.2d 806, 812 (Ariz. 1994).
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Instruction, and some legislators have attempted to take up the challenge." 79
Similarly, the Kansas and Iowa Supreme Courts refused to invalidate education
funding systems largely because their respective legislatures had recently
enacted entirely new systems with the intention of eradicating the disparities
present in the old systems.80 In fact, the Kansas legislature enacted the new
education system after a trial court found the old system unconstitutional in
1991.81 This prompt response by the Kansas legislature most likely increased
the amount of deference that the Kansas Supreme Court was willing to give.
With these cases in mind, the amount of deference the Ohio Supreme Court
gives the legislature should depend largely on whether the legislature has
already enacted remedial legislation, or whether it is content with the current
system and merely hoping that the court will uphold its constitutionality. If the
Ohio legislature is concerned that broad mandates by the supreme court will
restrain its legislative capabilities, then the legislature should take the initiative
by completely restructuring the present system now, before the Ohio Supreme
Court hears the DeRolph case.82 At the present time, however, the legislature
appears to be waiting to see how the supreme court rules before enacting any
type of sweeping legislation.83 Governor George Voinovich has voiced his
displeasure with the trial court ruling and has indicated that he is waiting for
the Ohio Supreme Court to rule on the issue.84 If this is indeed true, the
79 Id. at 816 n.9 (citing Education Finance: What a Mess, ARIZONA REPUBLIC, Feb.
22, 1994, at B8). The court, however, did order the trial court to retain jurisdiction "to
determine whether, within a reasonable time, legislative action had been taken." Id. For
more on the retention ofjurisdiction issue see supra part ]I.E.
80 See Exira Community Sch. Dist. v. State, 512 N.W.2d 787, 793 (Iowa 1994);
Unified Sch. Dist. No. 229 v. State, 885 P.2d 1170 (Kan. 1994), cert. denied sub nom.
Unified Sch. Dist. No. 244 v. Kansas, 115 S. Ct. 2582 (1995).
81 Unified Sch. Dist. No. 229, 885 P.2d at 1178. The trial court decision, Mock v.
State, No. 91 Civ. 1009 (Kan. D.C., Shawnee County, Oct. 14, 1991), was handed down in
October of 1991, and before the end of 1992 the legislature repealed the old school act and
enacted the School District Finance and Quality Performance Act. Id. at 23. Unless the new
act was facially unconstitutional (which it was not), it would be hard to imagine a situation
where a court, without jeopardizing its legitimacy, could strike down an entirely new system
of education.
82 See Levine, supra note 13, at 538-39 (arguing that legislators should seize the
moment and enact legislation that is completely of their own doing, rather than being
restricted by a court opinion telling them what they can and cannot do).
83 See Editorial, Education Gets the Spotlight; But That Doesn't Mean it Gets the
Innovation and Support it Needs to Better Educate Children, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER,
June 27, 1995, at 8B.
84 See Hawk, supra note 17; Mary Beth Lane, Education Cfher Wants Fair Funding,
CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, Oct. 15, 1994, at 7B. The Governor concedes that the current
funding system is inequitable, but he contends that it is not unconstitutional. Id. at 7B. This
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reluctance to change closely resembles that of the New Jersey legislature during
the Robinson era85 and should lead the Ohio Supreme Court to take a more
active role in the remedial stage of the litigation.
B. The Court Should Give a Workable Definition of a "Thorough and
Efficient" Education to the Legislature
Regardless of whether or not the Ohio legislature is dedicated to education
reform, the Ohio Supreme Court should give the legislature some guidance on
what constitutes a "thorough and efficient" education. This is not to say that
the legislature is incapable of interpreting constitutional provisions. Indeed,
members of the legislature take an oath to uphold the Ohio Constitution.86
With this in mind, however, advice from the high court is all the more
warranted. One can logically assume that the legislature believes they are
providing a "thorough and efficient" education through the current financing
and substantive education laws. 87 But because the legislature has not provided
either a "thorough" or an "efficient" education, it needs to know the correct
interpretation of these words. By defining the standard of education required by
the constitution, the court will not be displacing any legislative functions, but
will merely be serving as a "goad" or "backstop" to the legislature's
responsibility to meet constitutional standards.8 8 The court need not expound
for pages in defining "thorough and efficient"; rather, it should simply give a
common sense interpretation that can serve as the groundwork for a new
legislative scheme.89
reasoning by the Governor is perplexing at best. While a court has no power to remedy an
inequitable system that is not unconstitutional, the Governor is not so constrained. If he truly
believes the current system is "inequitable" he should act now to attack the disparities rather
than wait for the Ohio Supreme Court to rule on the issue.
85 See supra notes 62-65 and accompanying text.
86 See OHfoRLV. CODE ANN. §101.01(b) (Baldwin 1994).
87 This is especially true since the Supreme Court in Walter quoted with approval the
Illinois Supreme Court, which stated: "This court has consistently held that the question of
the efficiency of the educational system is properly left to the wisdom of the legislature."
Board of Educ. v. Walter, 390 N.E.2d 813, 824 n.12 (Ohio 1979) (quoting Cronin v.
Lindberg, 360 N.E.2d 360, 365 (1I1. 1977)), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1015 (1980).
88 Peter Enrich, Leaving Equality Behind: New Directions in School Finance Reform,
48 VAND. L. REV. 101, 175 (1995).
89 As stated earlier, see supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text, the purpose of this
Note is not to argue that funding systems which cause gross disparities are unconstitutional,
but to suggest a framework for what should be done by the courts if they do decide that
such systems are unconstitutional. In dealing with the first step of the issue, the court
certainly should consider in more detail the meaning of a "thorough and efficient"
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In defining the constitutional standard, the court should first focus on what
is not a constitutionally permissible level of education. This can be
accomplished by looking to Ohio Supreme Court precedent. In Miller v.
Korns90 the court stated: "A thorough system could not mean one in which part
or any number of the school districts of the state were starved for funds. An
efficient system could not mean one in which part or any number of the school
districts... lacked teachers, buildings, or equipment." 91 By giving this
pronouncement alone, the court would clearly establish to the legislature that
whatever type of new funding system the legislature chooses to devise,
essential resources must be provided to all of the school districts in the state.92
In other words, the court will not accept any system that leads to the results
produced by the current one.
In building upon the framework supplied by Miller, the court should then
tell the legislature that the basic "core courses" need substantial improvement.
While one would think that most students educated in the public school system
would at least have a good understanding of the basic courses, at the time of
the DeRolph trial seventeen thousand of the seniors in Ohio had yet to pass the
ninth grade proficiency test, a test that students must pass to graduate from
high school. 93 Why this alarming statistic alone does not convince the
legislature to overhaul the education system is a mystery. Yet something must
be done and it is the court's time to act. Unless students in the poorer districts
can master these basic skills, they will continually be at an extreme
disadvantage in the labor market. 94 A level of education must be provided to
ensure that this is no longer the case.
While these basic minimum skills are certainly important and essential to a
"thorough and efficient" education, they are not enough. An education that
education. What is given here are suggestions to the court for devising a framework that the
legislature can work with in dealing with this issue after it has found the current system to
be unconstitutional.
90 140 N.E. 773 (Ohio 1923).
9 1 Id. at 776.
92 While the court in Walter quoted this passage from Miller, it was in the context of
the discussion on how the legislature should be given great deference and discretion in
deciding what level of education is "thorough and efficient" and what type of program will
achieve that result. See Board of Educ. v. Walter, 390 N.E.2d 813, 815-16 (Ohio 1979).
93 DeRolph v. State, No. 22043, mem. op. 463, 473 (Ohio C.P., Perry County, July
1, 1994).
9 4 The New Jersey Supreme Court has continually referenced the constitutional
standard of "equip[ping] a child for his [or her] role as a citizen and as a competitor in the
labor market." Abbott v. Burke, (Abbott 11), 575 A.2d 359, 372 (N.J. 1990) (quoting
Robinson v. Cahill (Robinson 1), 303 A.2d 273 (N.J.), cert. denied sub nom. Dickey v.
Robinson, 414 U.S. 976 (1973)).
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does not prepare students to be effective members in our society and our
republican form of government can neither be thorough nor efficient.95 As the
New Jersey Supreme Court stated in Abbott II,
[tihorough and efficient means more than teaching the skills needed to compete
in the labor market, as critically important as they may be. It means being able
to fulfill one's role as a citizen, a role that encompasses far more than merely
registering to vote. It means the ability to participate fully in society, in the life
of one's community, the ability to appreciate music, art, and literature, and the
ability to share all of that with friends. 96
This third requirement, that the education system prepare our children to be
effective members of our democratic government, is the most important of the
three. Professor Edward Foley believes this requirement can be reached by
guaranteeing to all citizens the right to receive a college-level education in
political philosophy. 97 Such a guarantee, he argues, would: (1) fully allow
citizens to achieve personal political objectives; (2) allow citizens to make
better value choices about important public policy issues; (3) allow all citizens,
both rich and poor, to think more critically in order to avoid "knee-jerk"
voting on "tax-and-spending" issues; and (4) give citizens the tools to
determine the legitimacy of the very regime that governs them.98
Professor Foley's proposal is important for a number of reasons. First, it
provides a practical means by which eloquently stated goals can be reached.
While a court or legislature does not have to endorse Professor Foley's political
philosophy theory, his theory illustrates how complex education goals can be
simplified to include a smaller, but more focused, number of objectives.
Second, such a theory relies on the adequacy of educational opportunity, not
equality. 99 By defining the constitutional standard in adequacy terms, the risk
of a "zero-sum game" decreases and the opportunity for more localized control
increases. 100 Under an adequacy standard, families that place a higher value on
education can still spend more to achieve their desired level of education.
Adequacy also forces legislators and educators to focus more on performance-
based standards and less on equalizing tax dollars. For these reasons, a simple
95 See DeRolph v. State, No. 22043, mem. op. 463, 468 (Ohio C.P., Perry County,
July 1, 1994) (stating that "knowledge [is] essential to 'good government,' a concept explicit
in Article I, § 7 of the Ohio Constitution").
96 Abbott v. Burke (Abbott 1I), 575 A.2d 359, 397 (N.J. 1990).
97 See Foley, supra note 74, at 55.
98 Id. at 59-65.
9 9 Id. at 11-25.
100 See Enrich, supra note 88, at 167-68.
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adequacy-based standard provides the best means for reaching the third
requirement.
With this framework in mind, the legislature should know that a "thorough
and efficient" system of education includes three essential factors: (1) it must
not lead to insufficient "teachers, buildings or equipment" in any district in the
state;10 1 (2) it must provide the core educational classes in a manner that will
prepare the children of the state to be competitive in the job market with each
other and with those from other states and nations;10 2 and (3) it must provide
the tools to enable the students to become effective citizens in our society and
our republican form of government. 0 3
C. Total Education Reform Is Needed to Secure a "Thorough and
Efficient" Education
By not trying to repair a system that cannot be fixed, the Ohio Supreme
Court can avoid the problems faced in New Jersey. After nine judicial attempts
to establish a "thorough and efficient" education, it is clear that tinkering with
the numbers has not and will not lead to New Jersey's desired level of
education. Total education reform, not a chess game with tax dollars, must be
undertaken before meaningful change will occur.
To achieve total education reform, the Ohio Supreme Court should follow
the Kentucky Supreme Court's lead in Rose v. Council for Better Education,
Inc.,104 and declare the entire system of education in Ohio unconstitutional and
order the legislature to devise a new system.' 0 5 This would send a clear
message to the legislature that simply "rearranging the chairs on the deck" 106
would be an inappropriate response for a system so badly in need of repair. By
now there is hardly any debate that the traditional property tax-based system of
education, the system still present in Ohio, is inequitable and inefficient. 07
Expending more resources on a system that has not been successful in even
remotely achieving a "thorough and efficient" education is unwise and
101 See supra notes 90-93 and accompanying text.
102 See supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text.
103 See supra notes 95-97 and accompanying text.
104 790 S.W.2d 186, 189 (Ky. 1989).
105 As the Rose court stated: "[liest there be any doubt, the result of our decision is
that Kentucky's entire system of common schools is unconstitutional.... This decision
applies to the entire sweep of the system .... It covers school construction and
maintenance, teacher certification-the whole gamut of the common school system in
Kentucky." Id. at 215.
106 See Jonathan Riskin, Voinovich Plan for School Aid Branded Unfair, COLUMBUS
DIsPATcH, Feb. 5, 1995, at 1A-2A.
107 See supra notes 19-29 and accompanying text.
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unrealistic. As the Texas Supreme Court stated, "the system itself must be
changed.... As long as our public school system consists of variations on the
same theme, the problems inherent in the system cannot be expected to
suddenly vanish." 08 While the current state of affairs does call for more
money in the short-run to immediately address the lack of basic resources in the
poorest districts, 109 reworking the numbers in the present system will not
achieve the ultimate goal-a "thorough and efficient" education for all of
Ohio's children.
D. The Court Must Realize that More Money Alone Will Not Solve the
Education Crisis
Effective education reform cannot be achieved by focusing solely on
money. In striking down the entire system in Kentucky, the Rose court did not
simply order the legislature to expend more resources on the poor districts; it
ordered total education reform. 110 The court correctly realized what other
courts had failed to realize: that unless the focus of the analysis shifted from
education "inputs" to "outputs," 111 the same problems with the old system
would continue to plague the schools, regardless of how much more money
courts were willing to order the legislature to spend." 12
If the court follows the Rose plan and decides to jettison the entire
education system, it should not lose focus on the need for more money in the
poor districts. While today's schools operate extremely inefficiently11 3 and
many experts on education are arguing that education reform should focus on
more incentives and not more money,114 it can hardly be argued that students
being educated in facilities without running water, without restrooms, and with
asbestos and other unsafe and unsuitable conditions can be helped by mere
incentives. The school districts in which these children are educated need
108 Carollton-Farmers Branch Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist., 826
S.W.2d 489, 524 (Tex. 1992).
109 See infra notes 113-14 and accompanying text.
110 Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W. 2d 186, 215 (Ky. 1989).
111 See id. at 212.
112 See Benson, supra note 49, at 404.
113 See Eric A. Hanushek, When School Finance 'Reform" May Not Be Good Policy,
28 HARv. I. ON LEGIS. 423, 425 (1991).
114 See Eric A. Hanushek, Schools Need Incentives, Not More Money, WALL ST. L,
Oct. 5, 1994 at A16 (summarizing the findings of the "Panel On The Economics of
Education Reform"). But other experts continue to insist that there is a strong correlation
between financial expenditures and student performance. See Special Issue, Further
Evidence on Why and How Money Matters in Education, 20J. OFEDUC. FiN. 1(1994).
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immediate funds to obtain the essential resources that will allow a restructured
education system to succeed.
Aside from these pressing financial needs, the legislature should be
encouraged to move as far away from the old system as possible. Experts are in
growing agreement that, in order to raise the level of education, efficiency
problems must be addressed.'1 5 Numerous recommendations to improve
efficiency have been made, such as school choice or voucher programs, 116 site-
based management," 7 tuition tax credits," 8 merit pay for teachers," 9 and
merit awards for schools.120
If the Ohio Supreme Court follows the framework in this Note and strikes
down most or all of the education system, the court should give the legislature
deference in deciding the best route by which to achieve substantive change.
The courts are certainly not in a position to judge which type of new school
reform will most likely lead to a "thorough and efficient" education. The court
should simply: (1) find the entire education system to be unconstitutional; (2)
emphasize the problems in the "at-risk" districts and how without the proper
resources, a "thorough and efficient" education is not obtainable; and (3)
convey to the legislature that systematic change is needed and that the
legislature will possess the power to design and implement this systematic
change, as long as the change is designed to secure a "through and efficient"
education for all of Ohio's children.
E. The Court Should Retain Jurisdiction and Watch the Remedy Evolve
The trial judge should retain jurisdiction during the remedial stages of the
litigation.' 2 ' First, no individual has a better working knowledge of the case,
115 See Hanushek, supra note 114, at A16; Jonathan Riskin, Good Will Alone Won't
Solve Schools' Problems, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Nov. 25, 1994 at 15A.
116 Hanushek, supra note 113, at 451.
1 17 lohnathon C. Reitz, Public School Financing in the United States: More on the
Dark Side of Intermediate Structures, 1993 B.Y.U. L. REv. 623, 638 (1993).
118 Hanushek, supra note 113, at 451.
119 Id.120 Id.
121 Different states have different viewpoints on when a court can retain jurisdiction.
For instance, the North Dakota Supreme Court upheld a trial court's determination that the
funding system was unconstitutional, but reversed the trial court's decision to retain
jurisdiction. Bismark Public Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 511 N.W.2d 247, 263 (N.D. 1994).
The court, concerned about separation of powers implications, determined that a
declaratory judgment action provided an adequate alternative to the retention of jurisdiction.
Id. However, in Arizona, the supreme court affirmed the trial court's retention of
jurisdiction so that the trial court could "determine whether, within a reasonable time,
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the parties, and the issues than the judge who presided at the trial. 122 For
instance, in DeRolph, the trial court reviewed over five hundred exhibits, read
and ruled on over five thousand pages worth of deposition testimony, reviewed
testimony from thirty-eight witnesses who testified at trial and another thirty-
three who testified by way of deposition, and then spent one hundred twenty-
three hours ruling on post-trial matters.' 23 In all, the transcript of the
proceedings totaled over ten thousand pages. 124
The trial court's knowledge and familiarity with the case, combined with
its retention of jurisdiction, allows it to efficiently solve any problems that
might arise in the remedy process. 125 This supervision also helps to ensure that
the legislature will indeed enact legislation that is geared toward creating a
"thorough and efficient" system of education and that the legislature adequately
funds such a program. 126 In this respect, the retention of jurisdiction is
extremely important because courts have historically not protected
constitutional rights vigilantly when the violations resulted from legislative
inaction. 127 Also, with the knowledge that any shortcomings in the legislation
will be immediately subjected to judicial review, the legislature should have
more of an incentive to develop an acceptable system on its first attempt.
While retention of jurisdiction sounds like a drastic judicial remedy, it need
not involve any more than the court simply placing its seal of approval on the
plan developed by the legislature and then dissolving its jurisdiction.128 In fact,
if the remedy phase goes smoothly, this should be the extent of the court's
involvement. Furthermore, even if the newly created education legislation has
shortcomings, as long as the legislature understands the constitutional
legislative action has been taken." Roosevelt Elem. Sch. Dist. No. 66 v. Bishop, 877 P.2d
806, 816 (Ariz. 1994). It is interesting to note that besides the order to retain jurisdiction,
the Roosevelt decision is one of the most deferential. See supra notes 79-80 and
accompanying text. What should be gained from these two cases is that both courts realized
the importance of giving the successful plaintiffs a speedy and effective remedy. As long as
a state's declaratory judgment act is sufficiently broad, it should provide an adequate
alternative to the retention of jurisdiction.
122 See Note, Unfidfilled Promises, supra note 15, at 1085.
123 DeRolph v. State, No. 22043, mem. op. 463 (Ohio C.P., Perry County, July 1,
1994).124 Id.
125 See Note, Unfidfilled Promises, supra note 15, at 1085.
126 Id. at 1085-86.
127 Id. at 1022.
128 Id. at 1086. While the Kentucky Supreme Court did not actually retain jurisdiction
after its ruling in Rose, it reserved the finality of its judgment until the end of the legislative
session, to give the legislature time to enact an effective remedy. Once the new system was
enacted, there was nothing left for the court to do. Id. at 1086 n.101.
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requirements 129 and is making a good-faith effort to enact legislation designed
to satisfy the requirements, the court should refrain from issuing any injunctive
remedies; instead, the court should simply send the legislation back to the
legislature for more refinement. 130 Injunctive remedies should only be used as
a last resort-when it is clear that the legislature is either unwilling or unable to
enact legislation that satisfies the "thorough and efficient" requirements of the
constitution.
F. The Court's Role Should Decrease Dramatically After an Acceptable
Remedy Is in Place
After the court has dissolved its jurisdiction, 131 its active contribution to
the school funding debate should be finished. Reflecting back on all that has
happened up to the point at which jurisdiction is dissolved should remind the
court what an extraordinary undertaking it just performed. By dissolving its
jurisdiction, the court is opining that, on its face, the new funding system is
constitutional. When the magnitude of school funding litigation is considered
along with the arguments that the courts should not even be involving
themselves with issues of education and taxation, 132 invitations to revisit such
holdings, especially when the legislation is still young, should not be taken
lightly. This is not to say that the court should turn its back on all subsequent
challenges to funding plans; rather, before taking corrective action, it should
just be certain that the plan on which it gave its original approval fails to
conform to the mandates of the constitution.
In making this decision, the court needs to consider the extent of the
change from the old system. For example, if the "new" system is merely a
"variationi] on the same theme," 33 it is likely that the legislature did not
adequately address the structural problems with the system. The court should
act on any perceived constitutional violations under a system that has not been
significantly reformed. Alternatively, if the legislature enacted sweeping reform
legislation, the courts should be much more deferential in giving the system
sufficient time to develop. While courts have developed enough knowledge and
understanding of property tax-based funding systems that they can
authoritatively strike down such systems and their off-springs for the great
129 See supra part IV.C.
130 See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
131 See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
132 See supra notes 40-44 and accompanying text.
133 Carrolton-Farmers Branch Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist.
(Edgewood II1), 826 S.W.2d 489, 524 (rex. 1992). See supra part III.C for discussion on
why significant change is needed.
1995] 1267
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
inequities that they cause, completely new systems pose a more difficult
problem for the courts. Unless it is clear that the new system is incapable of
securing a "thorough and efficient" education, the wisdom and resolve of the
legislature in attempting to improve the overall level of substantive education
should be respected.
V. CONCLUSION
As the Twentieth Century nears its completion, public education in Ohio
and the United States is at a crossroads. The issue is clear: Are we content in
continuing with an education system that has led to gross inequities and large
inefficiencies, or are we willing to press for change and ensure a better future
for the children of our country. Many states have made an appreciable start in
the right direction by striking down property tax-based systems. As time has
shown, however, the powerful judicial rhetoric by the state courts has not led
to an acceptable legislative remedy. This Note has proposed a comprehensive,
yet practical approach for the Ohio Supreme Court and other courts to manage
the remedy stage of school finance litigation. Perhaps with an acceptable
remedy in place, "thorough and efficient" will no longer be an illusion but
instead will be a reality for all of Ohio's children.
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